On Two Explanatory Identity Criteria: One for Individuals, the Other for Properties

Matteo Nizzardo, J. J. Snodgrass (forthcoming). Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf073

ABSTRACT: Many philosophers believe that identity facts are non-fundamental facts, facts grounded in other facts. In this paper, we discuss what might ground the identity facts for individuals and properties by examining two explanatory identity criteria. One criterion, which we call the Explanatory Leibniz’s Law, is for individuals. The other, which we call the Explanatory Intensional Criterion, is for properties. We argue that, when combined with the widely accepted claim that grounding chains do not contain loops, these two criteria give rise to a contradiction.

Can we repudiate ontology altogether?

Christopher J. Masterman (forthcoming). Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70006

ABSTRACT: Ontological nihilists repudiate ontology altogether, maintaining that ontological structure is an unnecessary addition to our theorising. Recent defences of the view involve a sophisticated combination of highly expressive, but ontologically innocent languages, combined with a metaphysics of features—non-objectual, complete but modifiable states of affairs invoked in natural language feature-placing sentences like 'It is raining'. Nihilists argue that they are able to preserve the core of our ordinary claims without appealing to any ontology. In this paper, I argue that by repudiating ontology, the nihilist is unable to make their nihilist-friendly language intelligible in terms of a nihilist metaphysics which preserves an undemanding notion of unity exhibited by our ordinary claims. This puts significant pressure on the nihilist's claim that ontology is an unnecessary addition to our theorising.

Imagination, Mereotopology, and Topic Expansion

Aybüke Özgün, Aaron Cotnoir (2025). The Review of Symbolic Logic, (18) 1, 28-51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020324000236

ABSTRACT: In the topic-sensitive theory of the logic of imagination due to Berto [3], the topic of the imaginative output must be contained within the imaginative input. That is, imaginative episodes can never expand what they are about. We argue, with Badura [2], that this constraint is implausible from a psychological point of view, and it wrongly predicts the falsehood of true reports of imagination. Thus the constraint should be relaxed; but how? A number of direct approaches to relaxing the controversial content-inclusion constraint are explored in this paper. The core idea is to consider adding an expansion operator to the mereology of topics. The logic that results depends on the formal constraints placed on topic expansion, the choice of which are subject to philosophical dispute. The first semantics we explore is a topological approach using a closure operator, and we show that the resulting logic is the same as Berto’s own system. The second approach uses an inclusive and monotone increasing operator, and we give a sound and complete axiomatiation for its logic. The third approach uses an inclusive and additive operator, and we show that the associated logic is strictly weaker than the previous two systems, and additivity is not definable in the language. The latter result suggests that involved techniques or a more expressive language is required for a complete axiomatization of the system, which is left as an open question. All three systems are simple tweaks on Berto’s system in that the language remains propositional, and the underlying theory of topics is unchanged.

Carving Up the Network of Powers

Aaron Cotnoir (2023). Carving Up the Network of Powers. In Christopher J. Austin, Anna Marmodoro & Andrea Roselli: Powers, Parts and Wholes: Essays on the Mereology of Powers. New York, NY: Routledge.

ABSTRACT: Do powers have parts? Mereological thinking is typically guided by two different metaphors: building versus carving. The building picture treats wholes as constructed from fundamental bits; the carving treats wholes as the result of carving some interconnected space. After considering some suggestions for how to view powers as built from other components, this chapter opts for the carving picture and suggests that a mereology of powers can be generated by carving the underlying space of an interconnected web of fundamental powers. The space of powers is a network of manifestation/triggering connections that can be modelled graph-theoretically where the identity of a fundamental power is importantly tied up with its position in the overall structure. This chapter considers the idea that powers are completely identified by their position in the structure (as pandispositionalists have thought), which then places limits on the sorts of structures that powers theorists can help themselves to. This chapter also considers another novel suggestion on the identity of powers borrowed from non-well-founded set theory. It shows how to identify principles governing ‘carving’ the web into groups of closely connected powers, such that one group can naturally be called ‘part’ of another group, and explore the resulting mereology.